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Summary 
With the effects of global warming spiraling out of control States are rapidly 
recognizing the urgent need for behavioral change. The reactions of the 
planet to centuries of toxic emissions have to be battled collectively as soon 
as possible. 
 
Some States, especially developing States, are feeling the effects more 
tangibly and for them time is running out. Some scientific scholars already 
claim that time has run out and that we cannot alter the effects, but have to 
accept them and find solutions. 
 
This thesis will examine what legal options Small Island States have in 
general, and as a specific example the State of Tuvalu is being studied. How 
should these States proceed legally, and which would be the most 
advantageous way? The choice of Tuvalu was obvious as an example, as 
they in the past have threatened to instigate procedures against the United 
States of America for the effects they suffer from global warming. The 
Tuvaluan threat to instigate procedures against the United States, seems 
logical at least from the moral aspect. The United States is one of the largest 
emitters in the world and yet it refuses to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
This work also investigates the possibilities a State may have to use human 
rights as a litigation tool, but also the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
It should not be seen as a helpful tool for States but rather as an 
investigation of where international law stands today.  
 
 
 1
Preface 
While writing this thesis the help of several persons have been of great 
inspiration and invaluable help. 
 
First, I would like to thank my sister and girlfriend who have helped me in 
times when linguistic battles have occupied my mind. The positive support 
and encouragement from parents and my grandmother is invaluable, without 
who’s help this work would not have been possible. 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Jur. Professor 
Gregor Noll for providing useful insights, and for leading me into 
alternative routes of discussion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
When all the trees have been cut down, 
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Introduction 
During the past approximately 150 years, since the collection of temperature 
data started, the world’s average temperature has been rising. Eleven of the 
past twelve years (1995- 2006) are among the warmest in the instrumental 
record of global temperature1. The reasons for this rise in temperature are 
disputed; some scholars claim that it is due to normal fluctuations in our 
planets climate while others claim that the change is manmade mainly due 
to the increased emissions of greenhouse gases, deforestation, cement 
manufacture and the depletion of the ozone layer.2 With the last 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, published in 
April 2007, scientist have come to the conclusion the emission of 
greenhouse gases already has caused large impact on our planet.  
 
In the mid 90’s the small Oceanic State of Tuvalu threatened to instigate 
procedures against the United States and Australia for their failure to ratify 
the Kyoto protocol and the effects of global warming. Tuvalu is threatened 
by global warming in a more severe way than other states; the nation is 
literally about to be engulfed by the surrounding sea. The melting of glaciers 
and the huge ices at the North- and South Pole together with thermal 
expansion of the oceans brings about the effect of rising sea levels. Together 
with coastal erosion this threatens the very existence of Tuvalu with its 
highest point at only five meters above sea level, and a population of 
approximately 12,000.3 However not only the mere rising of the sea levels 
cause problems for Tuvalu, the intrusion of saltwater is adversely affecting 
its drinking water and the increased soil salinization disturbs its food 
production. The land also becomes more vulnerable to large waves, such as 
the recent tsunami, and storms. The Tuvaluan threat of turning to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), on the above mentioned grounds brings 
about legal difficulties of a nature that require further investigation. Never 
before has legal procedures of this nature been brought in front of the ICJ, 
and never before has the subject of climate change been as acute as it is 
today. Other Pacific island States facing the same threats include Tonga 
with a population of 116,000 people, Kiribati with a population of 107,000 
people and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean with a population of 370,000 
people.4 In total there are almost 30.000 islands in the Pacific, however not 
all are inhabited. There are three dominant ethnic groups in the area; 
Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian peoples. There are 22 different 
political entities, 15 of those politically independent, with a combined 
population of approximately one million, with Papua New Guinea being the 
largest State.  
                                                 
1 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p. 4 
2 B. Boer, R. Ramsay, D. R. Rothwell, International Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, 
p. 146:30 
3https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tv.html, (Accessed 2007/04/03, 08.30) 
4 Ibid., (Accessed 2007/08/22, 16.00) 
 4
 
The damages caused cannot be isolated and neither can the effects as such.  
Pollution as a phenomenon is transboundary by its very nature and hence 
difficult, if not impossible to protect against. Most inhabitants of this planet 
will be affected in ways perhaps not yet foreseeable. Certain degrees of 
effects can already be detected in tourism, the food-industry and soon also 
in the fields of migration as well as many others. People will be forced to 
leave their homes due to extreme weather conditions such as flooding or 
draught. Despite the devastating consequences this will have on the single 
individual, one might wonder what will happen when an entire nation such 
as Tuvalu is threatened? Small Island Developing States (SIDS) or Pacific 
Island Developing State (PCIDs) such as Tuvalu only produce a negligible 
fraction of the total global greenhouse gas emissions but pay the price for 
decades of pollution by the industrialized world, which historically have 
been responsible for the main fraction of emissions. PCID’s are only 
responsible for 0.03% of the worlds carbon dioxide emissions, and on 
average their inhabitants only produce one quarter of the emissions 
compared to the world average. Furthermore the people affected by climate 
change are often the ones with the least possibilities to cope with the 
changes facing them. Adding to this five of the PCID’s, the Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Samoa, have been classified as 
among the 49 least developed countries in the world, based on GDP per 
capita (under 900 $), human resource weakness criterion and economic 
vulnerability criterion. 
 
Are there any realistic chances of reaching a satisfactory result by 
instigating procedures before the ICJ against giants as the United States or 
other large greenhouse gas emitters? What obligations exist with 
international law for the protection of the environment in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction?  
 
According to the IPCC’s fourth assessment report of 2007, their panel of 
experts proclaim with a high level of confidence that the effects of human 
activities since 1750 has been one of warming of global temperature.5   
 
The purpose of this work will be to investigate what can be held against 
states that do not comply with obligations of a non-compulsory nature such 
as the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol itself is in fact a legal binding 
instrument). Is there any real possibility for other states damaged by the 
climate change to hold other states responsible? 
 
                                                 
5 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p.3 
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Delimitation 
For the sake of argument I am choosing to rely on the scientific evidence 
claiming that global warming is caused by increased emission of greenhouse 
gases causing a depletion of the ozone layer. This has with a high degree of 
certainty also been confirmed by the fourth assessment report of the IPCC. 
Theories based on the climate change being a natural phenomenon caused 
by climate cycles will therefore not be taken into account. The reasons for 
choosing to rely on the scientific evidence are obvious, since no State can be 
held responsible for actions beyond its control such as climate fluctuations.  
 
The focus of this work will be put on the possibilities of instigating 
procedures against a State actor in front of the ICJ or any other Court or 
forum for alleged breaches of principles in international law regarding 
environmental issues or contractual breaches. Does a population forced with 
migration have anywhere to turn when their State of nationality ceases to 
exist, due to a failure to reach the statehood criteria of the Montevideo 
convention? No immediate focus will be placed on what rights such a 
population can demand from an admitting State in terms of citizenship 
rights etc.  
 
The UN and its member States have often addressed the issue of State 
succession, where one States transfers into several new States, or several 
States turn into one, but it would appear that the extinction of a State, 
without a successor is not yet accounted for. 
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Method and materials 
The method used in this work has primarily been legal dogmatic together 
with a traditional legal method. The legal dogmatic method entails a 
description of the state of international law by analyzing the sources of the 
law including; conventions, treaties, customary international law, general 
principles, jurisprudence and literature. This method has been used to 
determine the obligations of States in the fields relevant for this work. The 
literature used is primarily and as far as possible by famous scholars, but in 
some parts other opinions have been taken into account. When using 
internet based materials, I have focused on using official sites of 
international organizations and agencies. 
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1 ICJ – a brief history  
The ICJ is according to article 92 of the United Nations (UN) Charter the 
principal judicial organ of the UN. It was established in June 1945 by the 
Charter of the UN and began it’s work in April 1946. The seat of the Court 
is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of the six principal 
organs of the UN, it is the only one not located in New York (United 
States). The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, 
legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on 
legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized 
agencies. The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for nine year 
terms of office by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The 
procedure of election combines both political and legal elements in a system 
established by the Root-Phillimore plan in 1920.6 It is assisted by a 
Registry, its administrative organ. Official languages used are English and 
French.7  
 
Any State member to the UN charter obliges itself to solve all matters of 
international concern by peaceful means.8 In specific terms this means that 
parties are to seek to solve their disputes through diplomatic channels, 
international arbitration or by submitting the matter to international judicial 
settlement, these amicable means of dispute settlement are enumerated in 
Article 33 paragraph1 of the Charter but the list is not exhaustive. 
 
 
1.1 Jurisdiction of the Court 
The Court is given its mandate through Article 92 of the UN Charter that 
stipulates that the Court shall function in accordance with its own statute 
(ICJ Statute).9 The jurisdiction of the Court is based upon the consent of the 
States before it. Only States can be parties before the Court in accordance 
with ICJ Statute art. 34, international organizations and individuals do not 
have access to the ICJ. The State in question must also be bound by the 
Statute, at least that is the general idea. Since the Statute is no treaty itself, 
rather an integrated part of the UN Charter, all states member of the UN are 
bound by the Statute (see restrictions in ICJ Statute art. 35 § 3).   
 
The Courts competence to investigate a case is not only based on the 
membership of the state parties. There must also be a ground for jurisdiction 
in the specific case pending before the court. Grounds for jurisdiction that 
                                                 
6 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed., p. 961 
7 http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&PHPSESSID=513bc1e13224ac5f3939a9ecf2eeb4f5 
(Accessed 2007/04/18, 10:50) 
8 Charter of the United Nations, YEAR, art. 2 para 3 
9 Ibid, art 92 
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the court has are Special Agreements between the parties giving the court 
jurisdiction in the specific case, a treaty between the parties established prior 
to the ICJ giving the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
jurisdiction, or through declarations to the Court giving it jurisdiction to 
cases of a certain nature.10   
 
As noted earlier the Court is a judicial institution given the task to decide 
cases on the basis of international law, as it exists at the time of its 
decision.11 The Court does not create law since it is not an organ of 
legislative character, as the Court states it in the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons Case “it states the existing law and does not 
legislate. This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court 
necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note its general trend”.12 
Despite the fact that the Court only has jurisdiction over questions 
concerning international law, it is impossible not to entwine those questions 
with factors of a political nature. While political aspects of a problem may 
be present in a case the Court is only concerned with establishing whether 
the pending dispute is one of a legal character able to be settled by means of 
international law or not. The fact that other elements may be present in a 
case cannot detract it from being a legal dispute.13
 
In July 1993 the ICJ established a special chamber only created to deal with 
issues of an environmental nature, however as of today no case has been 
heard before this chamber.14 Despite this, the mere fact that it has been 
established clearly shows that there is a growing understanding among 
states of this problem of international concern. 
 
1.2. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
Treaties 
The ICJ can as already mentioned earlier gain jurisdiction, pursuant to 
Article 36(1), if the parties before the Court have specially provided for it as 
a dispute solution mechanism under a treaty in force. The United States (as 
well as all other States) has entered into many Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) treaties with different states. These treaties are 
agreements of a broad character, which ensure that states are to treat the 
nationals of the other state in the same favorable manner as it treats its own 
nationals. There are generally dispute solution mechanisms in these treaties 
and even though they may vary, some do prescribe the ICJ as this 
mechanism. Despite the reluctant standpoint towards the ICJ the United 
States has shown historically, some treaties with the United States as one 
                                                 
10 Ibid, p. 114 
11 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed., p. 966 
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 237. 
13 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed., p 967. See also the Iranian Hostages case, 
ICJ Reports, 1962, pp.151, 155. 
14 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed., p. 754 
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state party do refer to disputes to the ICJ. For instance the FCN treaty which 
the United States has entered into with Denmark stipulates that the ICJ 
should be the dispute solving mechanism used by the parties under certain 
given circumstances, in detail it notes that: 
 
”Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or 
application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by 
diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice, unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other 
pacific means.”15
 
The wording in the treaty between the United States and the Netherlands is 
identical and the treaty is of the same character, an FCN treaty.16 Both the 
Netherlands and Denmark are low lying coastal nations who could in the 
future become potential plaintiffs should the rise of the sea levels continue, 
but any such speculation is of course very hypothetical. However the 
purpose of the treaty and especially the purpose of the ICJ as a dispute 
settler was not intended to cover disputes of this kind.  
 
As described above these treaties prescribes how the Parties shall, within its 
own national borders, treat nationals of the other Party. Hence disputes of 
this nature were with certainty amongst the intended ones the parties 
intended to be decided by the ICJ. The activities on American soil which 
contribute to global warming, such as greenhouse gas emissions, certainly 
harm foreign nationals as well as their property within the Unites States, but 
does it also contain an extension of the harm outside US borders. 
 
The ICJ has earlier had the opportunity to decide on an attempt to use an 
FCN treaty as basis for jurisdiction. In the preliminary phase of The Case 
Concerning Oil Plattforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States)17, 
Iran requested the ICJ to accept jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the 
destruction of three Iranian oil complexes by the United States Navy during 
the war between Iran and Iraq. In the case Iran argued that the court should 
accept jurisdiction over the dispute on the basis of an FCN treaty, the Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the 
United States. The treaty (which is no longer in force) contained a dispute 
solving mechanism clause that called for the ICJ to settle the dispute. 18 
According to Iran several treaty obligations of a general nature had been 
violated by the United States as a result of its military actions.  
 
In that case the Court found itself to have jurisdiction and hence recognized 
that FCN treaties may have an extraterritorial application. This decision 
                                                 
15 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America 
and the Kingdom of Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, U.S-Denmark, art.XXIV para 2. 
16 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956, U.S-Netherlands, art.XXV para 2. 
17 Concerning Oil Plattforms (Iran v. United States of America), 1996 ICJ, 803. 
18 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug.  
15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 901 
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made by the ICJ came despite the fact the dispute at hand was probably not 
one that was intended to be brought before the ICJ under the treaty, but the 
Court also generally reject the kind of broad interpretation of the language 
that would be necessary to bring a global warming case before it under these 
dispute solving mechanisms that are present in the treaties.19 It is obvious 
that there would have to be a broad interpretation of any such clause in order 
to include also global warming as one of the breaches or misbehaviors 
mentioned in the provision. The clause used by Iran was Article XXI p. 2 in 
the treaty and it is identical to then one quoted above from the FCN treaties 
between the United States and Denmark as well as the Netherlands.  Prior to 
this the ICJ had also accepted jurisdiction partly on the basis of a binding 
dispute resolution mechanism in a FCN treaty between the United States 
and Nicaragua in the Nicaragua case.20 Jurisdiction was accepted by the ICJ 
even though the United States tried to put the treaty out of force prior to the 
start of the proceedings. Thiswas not accepted by the ICJ and Nicaragua was 
allowed to instigate procedures. That was however a procedural question 
and one that will not be dealt with in this work.   
 
In the Nicaragua case as in the The Case Concerning Oil Plattforms the 
military activities caused by foreign involvement ha a direct impact on 
specific provisions of the treaty (the FCN treaty), more so than would global 
warming ever would. To what extent can damages caused by global 
warming be related to foreign activity, and can these be used as a basis for 
allocating jurisdiction to the ICJ on the basis of such a treaty? The first part 
of the question is a mere question of proof and not one which should be 
considered at the first stages. It is the second one which raises more 
difficulties, that question has to be answered affirmatively in order for the 
proceedings even to begin.   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Concerning Oil Plattforms (Iran v. United States of America), 1996 ICJ, 811-812. 
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), 1986 I.C.J, p. 14, 116, 136 
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2 State Responsibility in an 
environmental law context 
States are accountable for their breaches of international law under the 
principles of state responsibility. Breaches of international law, a customary 
law or treaty obligation legitimizes a claim from the injured state towards 
the violating state. These claims may take the form of diplomatic action or 
recourse to international mechanisms or to courts or tribunals where there is 
a jurisdictional ground at hand. Where obligations of a treaty have been 
breached, the injured states right to enforce these obligations are usually 
settled by the terms of the specific treaty. The EC Treaty for instance allows 
a member state that is of the opinion that another member to the treaty has 
failed to fulfill an EC obligation, to have the matter brought in front of the 
European Court of Justice.21 No damage has to have been suffered by the 
claimant, the violation of EC law is enough to acquire legal standing before 
the Court. 
 
In the field of environmental law and protection customary international law 
becomes important since it imposes several fundamental obligations upon 
states. The concept of territorial sovereignty is altered when it comes to 
actions within national territory that may affect neighboring states. The duty 
customary law imposes upon states is not to act as to injure the rights of any 
other state.22 This custom evolved from the regime concerning international 
waterways and the PCIJ judgment in the International Commission on the 
River Oder case. Here the court stated that the rights in a river are common 
for all riparian states. This was brought even further in the Island of Palmas 
case where its was argued that the territorial sovereignty also included an 
obligation for states to protect the rights of other states within its territory. 
In the Trail Smelter arbitration there was a dispute between Canada and the 
United States over sulphur dioxide pollution from a Canadian smelter 
factory close to the US border. The pollution from the factory caused 
damage to trees and crops on US territory.23 The Tribunal noted that: 
  
“under principles of international law, as well as the law of the 
United States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to 
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, 
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.”24
 
This approach has been reinforced by the ICJ in other cases such as the 
Corfu Channel case where it came to the conclusion that is was the 
                                                 
21  EC Treaty, Art. 227. 
22 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed., p.760 
23 Ibid. p.760-761 
24 35 AJIL, 1941, p. 182 and 35 AJIL, 1941, p 684 
 12
obligation of every state ”not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other states”.25 Furthermore the court noted in 
the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with 
Paragraph 63 of the Nuclear Tests Case in 1974 case in 1995 that the 
French nuclear testing in the Pacific was “without prejudice to the 
obligations of states to respect and protect the environment”.26 The 
obligations transferred onto States for activities within their jurisdiction that 
may harm other states appears to have increased as far as they are now part 
of a international customary law which may be growing more powerful. In 
the advisory opinion the ICJ gave to the UN General Assembly on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the ICJ noted that: 
 
 “the existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond national control 
is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment”.27  
 
This is of course very similar to what was noted in the Trail Smelter 
arbitration, but in the beginning of the 1940’s not yet part of the 
international customary law. This approach of a stricter responsibility upon 
states has now been reaffirmed in several international instruments such as 
articles 192 and 194 of the Law of the Sea Convention. The responsibility 
has become wider and now includes damage caused by pollution to the high 
seas, deep seabed and outer space.28 Not to be forgotten in this context is the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972 (hereafter 
Stockholm Declaration) and its Principle 21, which very much reflects what 
was noted in the cases described above. In addition to a state’s right to 
exploit resources within its jurisdiction, it also has a responsibility to ensure 
that such exploitation or other activities under their jurisdiction or control do 
not harm or cause damage to the environment, other states, or any other 
states. 
 
 
2.1 The appropriate standard and state 
conduct 
What could be considered the appropriate standard for the conduct of states 
in this field? Some argue that it is the standard of strict liability, according 
to which states are liable for the result of any pollution it was obligated to 
prevent, irrespective of fault from the state’s side. The advantage of this is 
of course that more responsibility is placed upon state actors, but it is indeed 
doubtful whether international law as of today has accepted such a general 
                                                 
25 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5 th ed., p. 761 
26 Ibid. p. 761 
27 ICJ Reports, 1996, para. 29 
28 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5 th ed., p. 762 
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principle.29 Case law in the field is not conclusive and opinions differ. 
While Canada’s responsibility was accepted from the start in the Trail 
Smelter case the strict liability theory was not accepted in the Corfu 
Channel case. Furthermore, treaty practice is inconclusive, and different 
treaties suggest different approaches towards the issue. However, most 
treaties tend to use the formula of the exercise of diligent control of sources 
of harm by the state.30 This test of due diligence (the level of judgement, 
care, prudence and determination that a person would reasonably be 
expected to do under particular circumstances) appears to be the most 
accepted standard and the one seen as the most appropriate one. As provided 
in article 194 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea from 1982, states are 
provided to take  
 
“individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent 
with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, 
using for this purpose the best practicable means at their 
disposal and in accordance with their capabilities”.31
 
In general it can be said that states are not automatically liable for all 
damages caused but it is dependent on other factors, which are specific for 
the treaty in question. The flexibility of the due diligence test must bring 
more complexity into the equation and it can only be seen in the light of the 
case specific circumstances. Yet a lot is required of the state actors, they are 
expected to take all necessary steps in order to prevent substantial pollution 
and to demonstrate behaviour expected of a state actor, which could be the 
establishment of systems of consultation and notification.32 Responsibility 
for states becomes relevant for damages that have already occurred. 
According to Malcolm N. Shaw international law does not recognize the 
responsibility for a risk of damage. Difficulties that would arise are obvious, 
how should the risk be assessed and how should compensational claims be 
calculated for a possible future event? It is however possible argues Shaw 
that customary international law in the future may evolve in this direction. 
But this remains to be seen.33 When damage has occurred the issue becomes 
to determine whether a certain level of damage has been reached. In the 
Trail Smelter arbitration the Tribunal emphasized the need to prove that 
“serious consequences” came from the toxic emissions, while other 
international treaties stipulates other obligations upon states when it comes 
to the effects of pollution.  
 
“The issue of relativity and the importance of the 
circumstances of the particular case remain significant factors, 
but less support can be detected at this stage for the linkage to 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p 762-763 
30 Ibid. p. 763-764 
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, art. 194, para. 1 
32 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5 th ed., p. 764 
33 Ibid, p. 765 
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a concept of reasonable and equitable use of its territory by a 
state occasioning liability for use beyond this.34”   
 
International instruments use a broad definition of pollution and its adverse 
effects, which stretches from harm to living resources or ecosystems, 
interference with amenities, and other legitimate uses of the environment, 
whereas the focus in the Trail Smelter arbitration was on loss of property. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer of 1985 defines the adverse 
effects on the ozone layer in article 1(2) as changes in the physical 
environment including climatic changes “which have significant deleterious 
effects on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity 
of natural and managed ecosystems or on materials useful to mankind,”.35 
Whereas the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 
1992 is even more detailed and brings in matters of biota and socio-
economic systems in its definition of the adverse effects of climate 
change.36
 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid, p. 766 
35 Ibid, p. 766  
36United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 1(1) 
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3 Rules, Principles and Treaties 
governing international and 
international environmental law  
In international environmental law, there are a set of principles and rules of 
a general character that are potentially applicable to all members of the 
international community for all the activities they carry out or authorize in 
respect to the protection of the environment. These are to be found in 
treaties, binding acts of international organizations, state practice and soft 
law commitments. Some of the more important principles and rules will 
hereafter be presented and described, they all have a broad, some even 
universal, support and are often used. These are: 
 
1. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2  
of the Rio Declaration; 
2. the principle of preventive action; 
3. the principle of co-operation; 
4. the principle of sustainable development; 
5. the precautionary principle; 
6. the polluter-pays principle; 
7. the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.37 
 
It is difficult to precisely determine the international legal status of all of 
these rules and principles. Therefore, rather the application of these in 
respect to a certain activity or incident, and the following consequences, 
have to be considered individually for each specific case.  The source of the 
principle; its language and textual content; the activity at issue; 
consequences of the activity (environmental as well as other); under which 
circumstances the issue occurred (actors, geographical location etc.) are all 
factors which need to be taken into consideration. 38
 
Of the above listed principles the Principle 21/Principle 2 as well as the 
principle of co-operation are the most well established and are basis for an 
international cause of action. In other words, these principles are part of the 
corpus of international customary legal obligations. A breach of these 
obligations would allow injured members of the international community to 
seek legal remedy.39 State practice among European states points in the 
same direction concerning the precautionary principle, which can be said to 
be part of a regional customary law in Europe. The legal status of the other 
principles is less clear, as they do not have the same internationally 
customary effect upon states, however they are binding in respect to treaty 
obligations and in some specific contexts as customary obligations. Even 
                                                 
37 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p 231 
38 Ibid, p. 231 
39 Ibid, p. 232 
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though their status is not always clear the principles are likely to shape the 
future development of international environmental law. In the following an 
attempt will be made to clarify the meaning and the status of these 
principles, whereas most focus will be placed on the Principle21/Principle2. 
 
 
3.1 Principle 21/Principle 2 
The objectives moving environmental law and its general principles forward 
are pulling in different directions. There is on one hand the idea that states 
must not cause any damage to the environment and on the other hand that 
states have sovereign right over their natural resources. This is also provided 
for in the Stockholm Declaration Principle 21, which states that: 
  
“States have in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.”  
 
The importance of the Principle has been growing ever since it was first 
adopted, and yet it has not been significantly altered since. However at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
1992, the Rio Conference, two words were added into its Principle 2, to 
recognize that states have the right to pursue ”their own environmental and 
developmental policies”. Principle 21 is now part of international customary 
law and the ICJ in its advisory opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons confirmed this in 1996.  
 
 
3.1.1 Sovereign right to exploit natural resources    
States have the right within the boundaries of international law to make use 
of their natural resources in ways they find suitable even though it may have 
adverse effects on the environment. This is the first fundamental part of the 
Principle 21/Principle 2, this idea was pre-existent to the Stockholm 
Declaration and comes from the general idea of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources from several UN General Assembly resolutions from 1952 
and onwards.40 These resolutions were adopted to ensure some state control 
over natural resources, and giving them legal safety to their investments 
with regards to foreign investors.41 In the beginning of the 1970’s 
reflections on the principle of state sovereignty in contrast to the need for 
                                                 
40 UNGA Res. 626 (VII) (1952); UNGA Res. 837 (IX) (1954); UNGA Res. 1314 (XIII) 
(1958); UNGA Res. 1515 (XV) (1960). 
41 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 236.  
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preservation of the environment started to appear42. In 1971 before the 
Stockholm Declaration was adopted the UN General Assembly stated that: 
 
“each country has the right to formulate, in accordance with its 
own particular situation and in full enjoyment of its national 
sovereignty, its own national policies on the human  
environment” 43
 
This was later formally recognized by of the Stockholm Declaration. 
 
 
3.1.2 Responsibility not to cause environmental 
damage 
The second fundamental part of the Principle 21/Principle 2 is the 
responsibility not to cause damage to the parts of the environment stretching 
beyond national jurisdiction. It reflects the opinion that states are subject to 
legal environmental limits despite its national sovereignty. The Principle 21 
and the responsibility not to cause these damages have been accepted as an 
obligation by all states and hence part of the international customary law 
placing legal constraints on the rights of states.44 The obligation of States 
not to cause environmental damage to areas beyond their jurisdiction is a 
principle that dates prior to the establishment of the Stockholm Declaration, 
although it was not until then it became part of international customary law. 
Now it can also be found in the preamble of the UNFCCC. The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) noted in the Island of Palmas arbitration that it 
was the obligation of all states “ to protect within the territory the rights of 
other states, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace 
and war”.45 This obligation upon states was later relied upon and widened in 
the Trail Smelter case when the arbitral tribunal stated that: 
 
“ Under the principles of international law… no state has the 
right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another of the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”46
 
This statement used by the tribunal was a citation from Eagletons work, 
Responsibility of States (1928) and has been accepted as customary law. 
This is supported by Judge de Castro in his dissenting opinion to the 
Nuclear Tests case.47
                                                 
42 Ibid, p. 237. 
43 UNGA Res. 2849 (XXVI) (1971). 
44 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., 241 
45 PCA, Island of Palmas Case, 2 HCR (1928) 84 at 93. 
46 United States v. Canada, 3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1907 (1941) 
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The general rule from the Trail Smelter case is closely related to the 
principle of good-neighborliness that is spoken of in article 74 of the UN 
Charter. This general principle is embodied in the principle of sovereignty 
which can be seen in a statement from the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case 
where it notes that it embodies “ the obligation of every state not to allow its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states”.48
 
Conclusively it can be said that the strong support reflected in the Principle 
21 manifests its central role as part of international customary law. The rule 
has developed with the conclusion of agreements in the environmental field, 
creating more detailed obligations to the basic objectives. The principle may 
very well provide for a legal basis for bringing claims under customary law 
of environmental damage. Application of the principle has to be seen in the 
light of the case specific circumstances and facts. 
 
 
3.2  Erga Omnes 
Traditionally the greater part of international law has its basis in relations 
between States, contractual or not, and is of a bilateral nature. Obligations 
agreed upon are owed to counterparts in a reciprocal manner, and any 
breach can potentially be a basis for the invocation of State responsibility. 
Professor Philip Allott has captured the special character of international 
law well when he described it as “the minimal law necessary to enable state-
societies to act as closed systems internally and to act as territory owners in 
relation to each other”.49 This bilateral view was very well expressed by the 
ICJ in 1949 in the Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, where it stated that: ”only the party to 
whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its 
breach”.50
 
Erga omnes (which is Latin and equivalent to ”towards everyone/all”) 
obligations differs from jus cogens of Article 103 of the UN Charter. The 
latter is distinguished by its normative power – the ability to override any 
conflicting norm – whereas erga omnes obligations “designate the scope of 
application of the relevant law, and the procedural consequences that follow 
                                                                                                                            
47 Australia v. France (1974) ICJ Reports 253 at 389. de Castro stated: ” If it is admitted as 
a general rule that there is a right to demand prohibition of the emission by neighbouring 
properties of noxious fumes, the consequence must be drawn, by an obvious analogy, that 
the Applicant is entitled to ask the Court to uphold its claim that France should put an end 
to the deposit of radio-active fall-out on its territory.” 
48 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 242-243; Corfu Channel case (UK 
v. Albania) (1949) ICJ Reports 4 at 22. 
49 Philip Allott, Eunomia. New Order for a New World, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 
324 
50 Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp 181-182 
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from this.”51. These obligations are owed to the international community as 
a whole, excluding no State, and entitles anyone to invoke State 
responsibility in case of breach. However no superiority is given to these 
obligations in respect to others, that is these obligations do not translate into 
any hierarchy.52
 
International law as we know it today has moved away from the traditional 
view of bilateralism. As early as the 1950s during the International Law 
Commission (ILC) debates on the Vienna Convention, the Special 
Rapporteurs recognized the difference between obligations that were owed 
to States through treaties in reciprocal relationships and what Fitzmaurice 
called “a more absolute type of obligation” – which is an obligation of an 
“integral” or “interdependent” character. He saw disarmament and 
humanitarian law conventions as obligations of such a character and such 
obligations could not be reduced into reciprocal State-to-State 
relationships.53  
 
The case most frequently referred to in early discussions on these 
obligations of a universal interest is the ICJ Reservations to the Genocide 
Conventions case. According to the court classical treaties were about 
normal State to State relationships, advantages and disadvantages and a 
basic contractual balance.54 From the reasoning it follows that under 
Conventions such as the Genocide Convention States are not pursuing their 
own national, individual interests but rather they had a “common interest, 
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison 
d'être of the convention” and “consequently, in a convention of this type 
one cannot talk of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the 
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between the right and 
duties”.55
 
The concept of erga omnes was first introduced to international law after the 
Barcelona Traction case where the ICJ in the dicta noted that: 
 
“an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a state towards the international community as a 
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another state in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all states. In the view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in 
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”56
 
                                                 
51 Fragmentation Of International Law:  Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And 
Expansion Of International Law, p. 193 para 380 
52 ibid 
53 ibid, p. 195 para 385. 
54 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention on the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p 23 
55 Ibid. 
56 Barcelona Traction Company Case (Belgium v. Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports 4 at 32. 
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“Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary 
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including 
protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the 
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body 
of general international law… other are conferred by 
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal 
character.”57
 
Regardless of the fact that it is being mentioned in the orbiter dictum, the 
ICJ has approved the concept and its importance across the globe has grown 
ever since. 
 
The Court here comes to the conclusion that there are different types of 
obligations, those that exist towards other States in the classical bilateral 
way and those which are the concern of all and in which all have a legal 
interest. The examples given by the Court of obligations erga omnes may  
have the nature of jus cogens as well, but the Court’s purpose was not to 
show their non-derogability, it wanted to emphasize the fact that some rules 
give rise to legal standing in the event of their violation.58 These obligations 
or rules are rules of a certain procedural character. The doctrine of erga 
omnes obligations has been confirmed by the ILC, in the ILC Draft on State 
Responsibility (2001) article 48 the final text, due to a compromise, was as 
follows: 
 
  “Any state other than an injured State is entitled 
to invoke the responsibility of another in accordance with 
paragraph 2 if: 
 
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States 
including that State, and is established for the protection of 
a collective interest of the group; or 
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international 
community as a whole.” 
 
Despite the compromise where violations constituting such grave violations 
against the international community where not labeled as “crimes” in the 
final draft, it was easily recognized from the text that there exists the 
possibility of invocation of responsibility by other than the injured State, 
which in its essence is erga omnes.  In the Commentary to the Draft the 
Commission clarifies that this provision is intended to deal with the 
obligations referred to in the Barcelona Traction case. 
 
Most, but not all, erga omnes obligations are to be found in the field of 
humanitarian law and the human rights. Legally no reciprocal obligations 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Michael Byers, ”Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes 
Rules”, Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 66 (1997) 211, p. 230. 
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are created in the classic bilateral manner, for example the obligation to 
respect the prohibition of slavery is not directed towards any particular State 
or its citizens, but rather towards everyone under its jurisdiction regardless 
of citizenship. In these situations there exists no quid pro quo, the obligation 
stays regardless of any other States behaviour. Normally according to the 
classic bilateral view a State which is responsible of torturing its own 
citizens, could only be held accountable by those, any harm attributed to 
anyone else would be purely notional in the sense that it would have to be 
based on a theory such as the erga omnes obligations. Despite a breach of 
obligations, no other harmed State would be found and under classic 
bilateralism there would be no State able to claim a right. But of course now 
the ILC has accepted the fact that there may be situations where States not 
directly affected by the breach in a material manner are entitled to claim that 
the breaches have infringed upon their rights, as being part of the 
international community as a whole. The ICTY summoned the concept of 
erga omnes in a good manner in its Furundzija judgement where it stated 
that: 
 
“Furthermore, the prohibition of torture imposes on States 
obligations erga omnes, that is, obligations owed towards all 
the other members of the international community, each of 
which then is a correlative right. In addition, the violation of 
such an obligation simultaneously constitutes a breach of the 
correlative rights of all members of the international 
community and gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing 
to each and every member, which then has the right to insist 
on fulfillment of the obligation or in any case to call for the 
breach to be discontinued.”59
 
The difference between “bilateral” and obligations erga omnes is very 
similar to the difference in domestic law between contracts and public law 
obligations. Contracts are made between two or more parties assigning 
rights and obligations only to the contract parties, whereas public law 
obligations concentrates on the situation where the relationship is between 
the public power an a single legal subject. Even if a breach of the public 
power obligation, which may violate an individual interest, is at hand the 
capacity to react to the breach lies in the hand of the public power. 
 
The ability of States to react is not restricted to measures of a collective 
process, this would actually lead to the meaningless of the erga omnes 
process as the only general collective reaction procedures are to be found in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It would be practically impossible to 
instigate such collective procedures due to the political nature of the UN. An 
obligation erga omnes is as mentioned above owed to the international 
community as a whole, but also to each and every State individually without 
any attachments. And hence any State may raise its voice and claim its right 
in case of another State breaching its erga omnes obligations.   
                                                 
59 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement of 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1, 
Trial Chamber II, 121 ILR(2002) p. 260, para. 151  
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An obligation erga omnes is hence an obligation of such great value and 
importance that they are a concern of the entire international community 
where all states are the bearer of the legal interest regardless of any damage 
suffered. Obligations that are considered to be of an erga omnes nature are 
for instance the outlawing of aggression and of genocide and the protection 
from racial discrimination and slavery aswell as a peoples right to self-
determination. The fact that all States may complain upon a breach of such 
an obligation increases the likelihood that a complaint will be made also 
emphasizes on the priority accorded to these norms. Obligations of an erga 
omnes character are defined through treaties or customary law and all 
international crimes are obligations with this character. This may seem 
logical as the international community as a whole identifies and may 
prosecute and punish the commission of these crimes, however the opposite 
is not the case, not all erga omnes obligations are international crimes. 
 
And even if a breach of an erga omnes obligation is at hand, the problem of 
judicial forum arises. In what forum can a State seek remedy for breached 
obligations of another State? 
 
 
3.2.1 Erga Omnes Partes 
Human rights agreed upon under treaties may constitute erga omnes 
obligations for the state parties, and only those, are to be known as erga 
omnes partes. This raises the obvious question of whether the right to a 
clean environment is considered as a human right and then an erga omnes 
obligation. The wide scope of the obligation may be based on the fact that 
the obligations in question often regulate internal behaviors of the State and 
hence no other states are likely to be materially affected by the breach.  
 
 
3.2.2 Erga Omnes and the Environment 
Some scholars such as Verheyen and Tol firmly believe that the Kyoto 
Protocol is part of what we know as erga omnes. Traditional erga omnes 
obligations were thought to be restricted to the protection of fundamental 
human rights as well as the prohibition of acts of aggression. But more 
recent international law and the jurisprudence there of has recognized the 
protection of environment as an obligation erga omnes. In his separate 
opinion in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Case, Judge Weeramantry stated that: 
 
“There is substantial evidence to suggest that the general protection of  
the environment beyond national jurisdiction has been received as  
obligations erga omnes.”60  
                                                 
60  Case Concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project: Hungary v Slovakia. 37 ILM 162. 
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This separate opinion, from one Jugde only, shows that there is recognition 
at a very high level of environmental protection being part of erga omnes.  
 
The ILC in the commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
mentions rules of special importance for safeguarding the human 
environment and rules prohibiting large pollutions of the world as being 
obligations erga omnes. Judge Weeramantry connects these rules to the 
question of climate change in his dissenting opinion in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, where he states that: 
 
 “The Global environment constitutes a huge, intricate, delicate  
 interconnected web in which a touch there or a palpitation there sends  
 tremors throughout the whole system. Obligations Erga Omnes, rules  
 jus cogens and international crimes respond to this state of affairs by  
 permitting environmental wrongs to be guarded against by all  
 nations.”61
 
From this it can be deducted that contemporary jurisprudence and the 
opinion of scholars recognizes that State actions that may damage the 
environment have to be considered obligations erga omnes. There is 
recognition and support for this as the destruction that would follow from 
climate change is so extensive and humanity as a whole would/will suffer 
from it. In the same dissenting opinion as above, Judge Weeramantry 
reasoned along the same lines when recognizing the adverse effect the use 
of nuclear weapons would have on humanity as a whole. 
 
 
3.3 The remaining principles 
The next part describes the legal status of principles 2-7 from the listing 
above. 
 
3.3.1 The Principle of Sustainable development 
The general idea behind this principle is that states should ensure that the 
use and development of their natural resources does not infringe on the 
needs of generations to come. In state practice the idea of sustainable 
development has been an issue since 1893 and the Pacific Fur Seals 
Arbitration, where the United States claimed their right to ensure the proper 
and legitimate use of fur seals, and for the protection of them from 
destruction by mankind. In 1987 the Brundtland Report (formally the World 
                                                                                                                            
Separate Opinion of Vice President Weeramantry section B.  
61 International Court of Justice: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Part 3 sec 4:1 (b) 
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Commission on Environment and Development) defined the term as: 
”development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. There are other 
elements to the principle which actors are to take into account besides the 
considerations of future generations and the “sustainable” exploitation of 
resources. Use of natural resources is to be equitable, considerations are to 
be taken of the needs of other states, and that environmental considerations 
are to be integrated into economic and development plans. The Rio 
Declaration Principle 3 concisely describes it as: 
 
“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably 
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and 
future generations”62
 
For this investigation it is important to point out that states according to the 
principle are mandated to, instead of burning fossil fuels, find alternative 
sources of energy in pursuing the goal to reduce global warming. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Precautionary Principle  
The objective behind the principle comes from scientific uncertainties. It is 
to provide guidance for states in the development of the environmental field. 
Its origin can be traced to domestic German law and the concept of  
“Vorsorgeprinzip”.63 No state shall be able to hide from responsibility by 
referring to an inconsistent scientific consensus, the principles main feature 
is described in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which provides the 
following:  
 
“In order to protect the environment the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by states according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”64
 
What this means is that, uncertainties on, for instance the environments 
capacity to absorb pollution, natural resources ability to cope with 
exploitation or the impact of certain activities, is to be taken into account 
when determining whether to proceed and what controls are needed. If 
                                                 
62  Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, Principle 3, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=11
63 (Accessed 2007-10-22) 
 
63 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 267. 
64 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, Principle 15, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=11
63 (Accessed 2007-10-24) 
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harmful effects of a certain activity are expected actors should be more 
cautious and allow for the possibility of error or ignorance, hence reflect a 
better understanding of science. This lowers the required standard of proof 
before preventive action is required, it doesn’t allow states to proceed with 
their activities merely because of lacking scientific evidence, nor does it 
require proof that there is no risk of harm.65
 
Another formulation of this principle is to be found in Article 206 of the 
1982 UNCLOS which provides that: 
 
“When states have reasonable grounds for believing that 
planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause 
substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to 
the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, asses 
the potential effects of such activities on the marine 
environment and shall communicate reports of the results of 
such assessments to the IMO.” 
 
Yet another recognition of this principle leaving even less room for 
confusion, as well as removing a possible use of a veil of ignorance, is to be 
found in the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, which provides the following: 
 
“Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack 
the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
 
The principle’s use is more widely spread in Europe than in the United 
States and it has been included in the Maastricht Treaty, the Barcelona 
Convention for Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea and 
the Global Climate Change Convention.66 Countries like Sweden and 
Denmark have even made the precautionary principle as well as other 
principles part of their national environmental policies.67 The use of the 
policy in the United States is however less clear, on a national level it has on 
occasions been used as a guide policy. However at an international level the 
United States does not adhere to it. It objects to other countries using it 
especially in the area of international trade. Against European countries 
active lobbying was conducted by the United States to prevent them from 
adopting the precautionary principle in the fields of beef hormones, 
genetically modified foods, electronic take-back and others.683.3.4 The 
Polluter Pays Principle 
                                                 
65 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, International Law & The Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 117 
66 J. Tickner, The Precautionary Principle in Action A Handbook, Written for the Science 
and Environmental Health Network, p. 2 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. p. 3 
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This emerging principle is more widely accepted in certain regions of the 
world than others, the concept is simple: the polluter should carry the cost of 
pollution. The Rio Declaration Principle 16 notes that:  
 
”National authorities should endeavour to promote the 
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic 
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard 
to the public interest and without distorting international trade 
and investment.”69
 
In general the application of the principle remains open to interpretation in 
the particular cases, especially with regards to the extent of the costs and the 
circumstances in which it will apply.70 The principle has been adopted by 
the European Community71 and by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development72.  
 
 
3.3.3 The Principle of Co-operation 
The Stockholm Declarations principle 24 reflects a general obligation for 
States regarding the issue of environmental protection. It is noted in the 
article that: “international measures concerning the protection and 
improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit”, 
and the Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration noted that: “states shall co-operate 
in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health 
and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”. The principles can be interpreted 
widely and includes more than just a co-operation to prevent environmental 
damage. In the light of the good-neighbourliness principle and the Rio 
Declaration principle 18, states are obliged to immediately notify states of 
any natural disasters or other events that are likely to cause unexpected harm 
to the environment of these states. This was clearly neglected by the Soviet 
Union in 1986 after the Chernobyl disaster but no States sought 
compensation, which was merely due to political considerations and not 
legal.73 A similar commitment can also be found in the Lac Lanoux and 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project cases, where notifications where central 
issues in the disputes.  
 
 
                                                 
69 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, Principle 3, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=11
63 (Accessed 2007-10-22) 
70 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2nd ed., p. 280 
71 Article 174 of the EC Treaty 
72 OECD Council Recommendations C(89)88 (1989) 
73 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2nd ed., p. 887 
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3.3.4 The Pricinple of Preventive Action 
As can be deducted from the name of the principle, the principle obliges 
states to prevent damage to the environment, and otherwise to limit, reduce 
or control activities which may cause such damage. The rationale behind the 
principle is to minimize environmental damage, and it requires action to be 
taken at an early stage, if possible even before the occurrence of damage. 
Indirectly the principle can be found in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration74 
and also in Principle 11 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which all speak of 
measures or legislational issues which should be considered. Implicitly the 
principle can also be found in a number of cases such as the Trail Smelter 
case and the Lac Lanoux75 arbitration. The principle is also to be found in a 
large number of treaties and conventions aiming to prevent environmental 
damage and harm to human health such as; the 1951 Plant Protection 
Convention Art. 1(1), the preamble of the Oil Pollution Prevention 
Convention from 1954 and the UNFCCC Art. 2 as well as many others. This 
shows the wide support from the international community in this principle. 
 
 
3.3.5 The Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility 
Equity is the ruling thought behind this principle. It has developed from the 
recognition of the differentiated needs and capabilities of different state 
actors. The special needs of developing countries in respect to the developed 
countries must be taken into account in the development, interpretation and 
application of international environmental law. Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration notes the following on the principle: 
  
“States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, states have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and 
of the technologies and financial resources they command.” 
 
The UNFCCC Article 3(1) uses a similar language and provides that state 
parties to the Convention should act to protect the climate system “on the 
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities”. The principle contains two elements of 
                                                 
74 See Principles 6, 7, 15, 18 and 24 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment  
75 The Lac Lanoux arbitration between France and Spain concerned the proposed diversion 
of a shared watercourse by France which had impacts on the Spanish side of the border. 
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which the first is the common responsibility of states for the protection of 
the global environment, or at least parts of it. The second elements takes 
into consideration the different capabilities states have, the different 
circumstances at hand in relation to each states contribution to a specific 
environmental problem and its ability to prevent, control and reduce the 
problem. 
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4 Is the Right to a Clean 
Environment also a Human 
Right  
A clean or healthy environment as a term in this context refers to a right to 
individuals and groups of people to live in an environment that is free from 
largescale air-, water-, or landpollution.76 In this study it would relate to the 
people of Tuvalu not to have their country flooded by sea-water. In the 
following it will be investigated whether such a right exists in contemporary 
international law.  
 
Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute sets out the sources of international law, from 
where obligations upon States are obtained. It states that: 
 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; 
 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law. 
 
Courts in interpreting international law generally follow the hierarchy of the 
article. While Article 59 of the Statute makes it clear that the ICJ should not 
take past decisions (except its own) into consideration it is very rare that the 
Court departs from its previous decisions and does treat them similar to 
precedents in the common law system. 
 
                                                 
76 R. Churchill, Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties, (found in 
Anerson and Boyle, Human Rights to Environmental Protection, p 89.) 
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4.1 Universal and regional level 
A right to a healthy environment is only found explicitly mentioned in 
regional instruments in Africa and the Americas.77 In other, universal 
instruments this right cannot be found this clearly, but its existence in those 
above mentioned instruments is evidential of an existing regional customary 
law. There are references to rights in universal instruments that may be seen 
as inseparable from the right to a healthy and clean environment, but it 
requires extensive interpretation which may not be appropriate. In the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
it is stated that parties to it should: 
  
“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health…steps to be taken by the State Parties to achieve the 
full realization of this right shall include those necessary 
for…the improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene.”78
 
This article recognizes the right to a high standard of living and puts 
environmental hygiene as prerequisite to be able to attain this standard. 
Article 24 of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child links the right to 
the obligation of States to consider any risks of environmental pollution.79 
Despite these references being made to the right of a healthy environment 
they are being seen as peripheral to other rights considered to be of greater 
value. 
 
The Stockholm80 and Rio Declarations81 have however gone somewhat 
further and recognized that there is a connection between the right to a 
healthy environment and human rights. These declarations are though only 
considered to be of a declaratory nature and are hence not part of binding 
international law. Despite that some of their principles have now become 
part of international customary law, the right to a healthy environment 
cannot be considered as one of those.  However as recognition of these 
issues is increasing, a new set of human rights might evolve in the future. 
 
                                                 
77 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, Article 24, and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Protocol of San Salavador), Article 11. 
78 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12:1  
79 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 24 
80 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, ”Both 
aspects of man's environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-
being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself.”, Preamble, and, 
”Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”, Principle 1 
81 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ”Human beings are at the 
centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature.”, Principle 1.  
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In Europe neither the European Social Charter nor the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms recognize 
the right to a healthy and clean environment; the Treaty of Amsterdam 
contains no such rights either. As none of these important human rights 
instruments recognize this right, it cannot be considered part of a regional 
customary law in Europe. Hence with the exception of European and North 
American custom it can most likely not be considered to be a general 
principle of international law, as these two systems are important in such 
determination. There is however in the Aarhus Convention a statement 
which reads: ”…every person has the right to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her wellbeing…”. 82But according to the authors that does 
not guarantee a right to an “adequate environment”. 
 
The second source in determining international law is customary law, this is 
a more living part of international law and its consists of two elements, 
opinio juris and state practice. The practice of Latin American and African 
courts and treaties in recognizing the right to a healthy environment as a 
human right indicates the existence of a regional customary law, but not a 
universal. Customary international law can be created very fast and even 
though the rules considered are relatively new, in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case the ICJ came to the conclusion in that: 
 
“Although the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of 
customary international law on the basis of what was originally 
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would 
be that within the period in question, short though it might be, 
State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually 
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;  -and should 
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”83
 
This is what is today sometimes referred to as instant customary law. 
 
General principles of international law are supplementing custom and 
treaties when it comes to the determination of existing international law. 
The practice of the international community may in some cases lead to a 
principle’s evolvement into customary law. In the Trail Smelter Case the 
court reached the conclusion that States shall not allow activities within 
their territory that may harm territory outside its own jurisdiction. This 
general principle has since that been included in many treaties and 
declarations and is now considered part of international customary law. 
Many States have included a right to a healthy environment in their national 
                                                 
82 M. Adebowale, C. Church, B. Nduta Kairie, B. Vasylkivsky, Y. Panina, Environment and 
Human Rights: A New Approach to Sustainable Development, International Institute for 
Environment and Development p.3 
83 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 74  
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legislations, for instance Colombia and Croatia have such rights.84 But as 
dominating countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States do 
not recognize these rights it may be too early to speak of this as a general 
principle of international law. 
 
The principle of stare decisis, where prior judicial decisions are considered, 
does as described earlier not exist in international law. It is however 
common in the decisions of the European Union Court of Justice, European 
Court of Human Rights and ICJ to consider past decisions. Past decisions on 
the content of international law are often given the status of persuasive 
evidence, and decisions of international tribunals are considered more 
important than domestic courts. Most important are the decisions of the ICJ. 
As of today none of the above mentioned courts have adjudicated a case 
where recognition was specifically paid to a right to a healthy environment. 
However the ICJ in the case Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, a case of treaty 
interpretation between Hungary and Slovakia, highlighted the importance of 
evolving environmental norms, and that States shall take these into 
consideration. But they were not declared to be obligatory by the ICJ. And 
while the case does not directly recognize the existence of a human right to 
a healthy environment, international law seems to be evolving in this 
direction and the future will most likely hold such a right. 
 
Despite all this there is no doubt that a human right to a healthy 
environment does exist in some regions of the world, but it is not legally 
binding upon others outside of that territory. 
 
However there are other rights that may also be in danger in the aftermaths 
of global warming. For instance the right to life itself is likely to be 
infringed upon by global warming. The possibilities of survival decrease as 
the effects of global warming become more apparent, the rise of oceans 
make certain inhabited areas inhabitable.  
    
 
                                                 
84 Constitution of Colombia, Article 79, and, Constitution of Croatia, Article 69, found at, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/country.php, (Accessed 2007/10/11) 
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5 Global Warming and the 
Ozone Layer 
 
The ever rising temperature of the last decades, and the expected rise in the 
decades to come has come to turn focus onto consumption of fossil fuels 
and deforestation. Together with the depletion of the ozone layer, that has 
the effect of letting through more ultraviolet radiation to the surface of the 
earth, this is a matter of growing concern. Regarding the ozone layer there is 
a problem of legal characterization, the layer is, according to article 1(1) of 
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,  “the 
layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary layer”. Hence this 
area constitutes a unit of itself not part of any national jurisdiction or 
sovereignty. But according to the UN General Assembly resolution 43/53 
global climate change, of which also the depletion of the ozone layer is part, 
“is the common concern of mankind”. A growing number of voices 
worldwide also recognize that issues of this magnitude can only be tackled 
on an international or global scene. Under the Convention, which was 
adopted in 1985 and entered into force three years later, state parties agree 
to take actions to protect human health and the environment from adverse 
effects resulting from human activities that modify or may modify the ozone 
layer. Co-operation, collective collection of relevant data and agreed 
measures such as legislative or administrative action were also agreed upon 
in order to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities under their 
jurisdiction or control “should it be found that these activities have or are 
likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely 
modification of the ozone layer”85. The Convention is however not much 
more than a framework within which further action can be taken, for 
instance with the help of more detailed protocols. One such is the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, it urges its 
signatories for a phased reduction of chlorofluorocarbons and a freeze on 
the use of “halons86”.87
 
Regarding the results of the depletion of the ozone layer and specifically the 
global warming less action has been taken at an international level. The UN 
General Assembly in 1988 and 1989 brought forward the resolutions 43/53 
and 44/207, which recognized that the climate change was a concern 
common to all mankind and determined that action had to be taken to deal 
with the issue. A call for a convening conference on climate change was 
brought forward by the General Assembly and the UNEP Governing 
Council Decision on Global Climate Change. Complementing this the 
Hague Declaration on the Environment 1989, urged states to establish a new 
                                                 
85 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, Article 2 
86 Defined as any of a number of unreactive gaseous compounds of carbon with bromine 
and other halogens, used in fireextinguishers, but now known to damage the ozone layer. 
87 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5 th ed., p. 785 
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institutional body, under the UN regime to work against global warming and 
to start negotiations on the necessary legal instruments. Following this the 
UNFCCC was adopted in 1992.  
 
The purpose of the Convention, which can be found in its second article, is 
to achieve a stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level 
that prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the environment. 
Such a level should be reached within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems and organisms to naturally adapt to climate change, and to 
ensure that food production is not threatened as well as to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. States parties to the 
Convention commit themselves to develop, update and publish national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions (emissions related to or influenced 
by the impact of man on nature) by sources and removals by sinks88 of all 
greenhouse gases not covered by the Montreal Protocol. Article 3 of the 
Convention sets out a number of principles for its signatories, one of these 
provides for differentiated responsibilities between the developing and the 
developed countries as follows: 
 
 “In their actions to achieve the objective of the convention and  
to implement its provisions the parties shall be guided, inter 
alia, by the following: 
1. The parties should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.” 
 
This grouping of countries is consistent throughout the Convention and it 
groups countries into four categories reaching from the “developed 
countries” to the “least developed countries”. In between these two are 
“countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy” and 
the “developing countries”.89 Due to the differing economic capacities of 
developed states and the problems faced by the former socialist states of 
eastern Europe led to an unusual distinction to be drawn in the Convention. 
A distinction was made between “all developed country parties and 
developed parties (included in Annex I), and those developed country 
parties and developed parties not “”undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy””(listed in Annex II).90Several other measures that states 
committed themselves to can be found in article 4(1) of the Convention. 
These include the formulation and implementation of national and regional 
                                                 
88 Defined as a body or process that acts to abrorb or remove energy, in this case 
greenhouse gases, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. This 
can be the increasing of forests. 
89 B. Boer, R. Ramsay, D. R. Rothwell, International Environmental Law in the Asia 
Pacific, p. 153 
90 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 361 
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programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and the update 
of such already existing; to promote and co-operate in the development, 
application and transfer of technologies and processes to control, reduce or 
prevent anthropogenic emissions; to promote sustainable management and 
conservation of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol; to take climate change considerations into 
account to the extent feasible in their relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies; and to promote and co-operate in research, 
exchange of information and education in the field of climate change.91 The 
commitments that more developed countries oblige themselves to are 
naturally more far-reaching than those of developing countries, the former 
are to take the lead in scientific development and policy making. The 
supreme body of the Convention is its Conference of all the member states, 
which in general meets annually for a session period of two weeks. The 
main objective of the Conference is to evaluate the status of climate change 
and the effectiveness of the treaty. National activities of member states are 
examined, mainly by reviewing national communications and emissions 
inventories. It also evaluates new scientific findings and tries to capitalize 
on experience as efforts to address climate change proceed.92 In 1994 the 
Convention entered into force and in 1995 it held its first Conference in 
Berlin. Here it was agreed upon that the pledges by developed countries to 
reduce emissions by 2000 to the levels of 1990 were not enough, and 
commenced to draft further legal instruments by 1997.  No further 
commitments should be placed on developing countries, but they should be 
assisted so they could reach the already existing commitments.93  
 
 
5.1 The Kyoto Protocol – a brief history 
In 1997 the Convention was supplemented by the Kyoto protocol. It is an 
international agreement which builds upon the UNFCCC, and sets legally 
binding targets and timetables for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Protocol was adopted since the parties to the Convention in 
1995, at a meeting in Berlin, determined that the commitments provided for 
in Article 4(2)(a) and (b) of the Convention were not adequate.94 The text of 
the protocol was unanimously adopted in 1997 and entered into force on 
February 16 2005. The Protocol is a complicated agreement that was slow in 
coming and required long negotiations between the parties, due to the need 
for an effective instrument which could effectively tackle the problem and 
of political considerations. After the Protocol was accepted in 1997 further 
negotiations were needed on how it should operate. Rules relating the 
operative part were agreed upon in 2001 and are known as the “Marrakesh 
Accords”. Bearing in mind the economic and developmental implications 
                                                 
91 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 4(1) 
92 http://unfccc.int/essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2915.php, (Accessed 
2007/05/17, 09:50) 
93 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5 th ed., p. 788 
94 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 369  
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for the parties, it is not surprising that the negotiations were among the most 
difficult and complex ever conducted for a multilateral treaty in the field of 
environmental protection. There were deep divisions between the state 
parties regarding many of the most important issues of the treaty, such as 
emission reduction targets, sinks, emission trading, joint implementation 
and the treatment of developing countries. Despite the consensus reached 
following negotiations regarding detailed rules, guidelines and 
methodologies needed for the implementation have proven difficult. In the 
beginning of 2001 the future of the Protocol was at stake as the President of 
the United States George W. Bush announced that the United States would 
not ratify the Protocol, this despite the fact that the United States is 
responsible for about a quarter of 1990 greenhouse gas emissions globally.95
 
Despite this setback the remaining states reached an agreement on 
mechanisms for implementing the commitments under the Protocol, these 
are know as the “Bonn Agreements” and are not drafted as legal text. It 
instead reflects the remaining states will to proceed with the Protocol with 
or without the United States. It then remained for the parties of the political 
agreement in Bonn to convert this into a legal text, this was agreed upon in 
2001, the “Marrakesh Accords”, and almost all of the agreements made in 
Bonn were incorporated.  
 
The mandatory greenhouse gas emission targets for the world’s leading 
economies is the Protocols most important feature. The targets set vary from 
-8% to +10% from the nations 1990 gas emissions levels. In the majority of 
cases the new limits for nations, even those at the +10% level, call for a 
significant reduction of emissions from the prior level, all levels are set at an 
individual basis for each nation.96 If a nation should fail to reach up to the 
levels put up in the Protocol there is a possibility to compensate this by 
increasing sinks, that is forests or other carbon dioxide removing 
mechanisms. There are other mechanisms in sub-chapters to the Protocol, 
named “emission-trading”, the “clean development mechanism” and “joint 
implementation”, which can be used to get around the set emission levels.  
 
The one most important achievement of the Kyoto Protocol was the 
commitments made by Annex I parties to quantified emission reductions 
targets, and a timetable for their compliance. This obligation is set out in 
Article 3(1), and the parties “shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts”. 
In accordance with Article 3(2) of the Protocol the Annex I parties are 
required to ”have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments 
under the Protocol”. Not surprisingly the determination of emission targets 
for the Annex I parties proved to be a difficult issue, but Annex B lists 
differentiated targets set individually for countries which were agreed upon. 
There are six gases covered by the emission reduction commitments of the 
                                                 
95 Ibid, p. 370 
96 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2879.php, (Accessed 2007/05/17, 
13:55) 
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Annex I parties and these are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride and they are 
to be found in Annex A. There were disputes over the number of gases to be 
included, but an agreement was reached on those six gases with the 
possibility to use 1995 as its base year for the latter three.97
 
 
5.1.1 Emission trading, clean environment 
mechanism and joint implementation 
 
Even with set emission levels for states there are possibilities to alter these 
with means acknowledged by the signatories of the Protocol. They were 
taken up in the Protocol mainly due to its strong support among some of the 
worlds leading economies. The most original and criticized aspect of the 
Protocol was the proposal to enable Annex I parties to meet their 
commitments by purchasing or trading credits representing greenhouse 
reductions in other countries parties to the Protocol. This was strongly 
opposed by China, the Group of 77 developing countries and other states, 
and hence a compromise had to be reached.98 Article 17 of the Protocol 
allows Annex B parties to “participate in emissions trading for the purposes 
of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3”, however such trading must 
be a supplement to already domestically taken actions for emissions 
reductions. The conference of the parties was to decide on the details of 
such emission trading, for instance by defining relevant principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines.99  
 
Another incentive mechanism brought into the Protocol was the possibilities 
for Annex I parties to se joint implementation for emission reduction 
commitments. For the purpose of meeting the commitments provided for 
under Article 3 any Annex I party may transfer to, or acquire from another 
Annex I party “emission reduction credits resulting from projects aimed at 
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy”100. 
Private legal entities may be authorized by Annex I parties, under who’s 
jurisdiction they are, to participate in actions leading to the transfer, 
generation or acquisition of emission reduction units from joint 
implementation. But it must result in a reduction in emissions or an 
enhancement of removals by sinks which is additional to any other removals 
and supplemental to domestic actions already occurring. 
 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the Clean Development 
Mechanism, this mechanism enables Annex I parties to gain emission 
                                                 
97 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 372 
98 Ibid, p.373 
99 Kyoto Protocol, Article 17. 
100 Ibid, Article 6. 
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reduction credits to assist them in reaching compliance with their 
commitments under Article 3. This mechanism allows Annex I parties to 
invest in emission reduction projects in non-Annex I parties and use the 
certified emissions reductions benefits from those projects “to contribute to 
compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3”. In other words it is a way of cleaning the 
polluters conscience.101  
                                                 
101 P. Sands, Principles of International Law 2 nd ed., p. 373-374 
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6 Tuvalu turning to legal 
action? 
 
Until now, legal disputes between sovereign States have in general been 
concentrating on the matters of trans-boundary pollution, for which a 
damaged State has sought compensation or other relief from the polluting 
State.102 There has never before been a case where one State has filed 
procedures against another State on the grounds of liability for climate 
change and specifically the effects of global warming. As of today no 
formal application to the ICJ has been filed and no written statements from 
Tuvaluan side are available, the following investigation will have to 
consider several tracks running side by side in order to see what routes 
might be open for Tuvalu. 
 
The grounds on which Tuvalu appear to be preparing to instigate procedures 
against the United States and Australia, neither of whom have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, is that the rising sea levels threatening its existence are 
caused by global warming. Hence there must be found a casual relationship 
between the rising sea levels threatening Tuvalu and greenhouse gas 
emissions by the United States and Australia. The IPCC and its scientists in 
its last and fourth assessment report came to the conclusion that the 
emission of greenhouse gases has already had a significant impact on the 
planet. It was also noted with a high degree of certainty that the effects of 
human activities and emissions since 1750 have been one of global 
warming. 
 
After a referral to the ICJ, but prior to the starting of procedures, it must be 
determined whether the disputed question lies within the competence of the 
ICJ. Does the ICJ have jurisdiction over the dispute and is the required 
consent from the disputing parties at hand?103 Also, before proceedings may 
start, the admissibility of the case must be investigated, the disputants legal 
standing, the injured states legal interests, the governing legislation and the 
nature of the matter disputed. 
 
The planned instigation of Tuvalu most likely seems to be based on 
breaches of general obligations under the UNFCCC of the United States and 
Australia. Lack of commitment from the defendants to combat global 
warming by not taking strong enough measures under the UNFCCC.  The 
failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and not prioritizing the battle against 
global warming, have violated obligations of a general character in the 
UNFCCC. A failure to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, article 2. 
Not taken required precautionary measures, article 3. The lack of 
participation in various forms of international cooperation, articles 3-6. This 
                                                 
102 An example of this is the Trail Smelter case between the United States and Canada. 
103 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(1) 
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must be seen as the most likely way for Tuvalu to approach the matter of the 
governing legislation in the case, breaches of obligations in the UNFCCC. 
Article 4.2. of the Conventions stipulates measures States shall adopt for the 
mitigation of climate change, by “limiting its anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases.”104 The treaty itself sets no binding limits or goals to 
reach it does impose some obligations of importance on States and it is 
according to Strauss, the most promising forum for a future climate change 
litigation.105
 
What Tuvalu appears to hope to achieve by instigating procedures against 
the defendants seems to be a retroactive relief, also known as ex post facto 
relief, for the violation of Tuvaluan legal interests. In other words from the 
submersion of Tuvaluan territory and damages that follows from this, 
caused by international illegal acts that stem from violations of the 
defendants obligations under the UNFCCC.  
 
What also might cause some difficulties for Tuvalu in the dispute at hand is 
whether it can be argued that they have legal standing as plaintiffs under the 
present circumstances. Whether a plaintiff has standing or not is according 
to the ICJ to be determined in the light of the admissibility of the case, as 
the ICJ has pointed out earlier. It will not be enough for Tuvalu to 
demonstrate that it has suffered loss following breaches of general 
obligations under the UNFCCC, but rather Tuvalu must show that it has 
suffered losses following violations of its legal rights. Do the obligations 
included in the UNFCCC provide legal standing of Tuvalu when breached? 
Emissions of greenhouse gases are in most cases conducted by private 
entities such as multinational companies and associations and hence not ipso 
facto attributable to the state itself. So in order to point at a breach of an 
obligation from the United States or Australia, Tuvalu has to prove that 
these actions are attributable to the state even though not directly conducted 
by it. A specific obligation to control the emissions by private entities or 
regulate for the state has to be at hand.  
 
Tuvalu is if they decide to instigate these procedures facing a real problem 
in this context, as the UNFCCC is nothing more than a framework with 
general principles and shared goals and future visions. The state parties are 
handed the responsibility to define its own obligations and standards. There 
are no specific reduction targets or other obligations to be met stipulated in 
the UNFCCC. These are to be found in the later concluded Kyoto Protocol 
which, as has already been mentioned, is an optional instrument to the 
UNFCCC.  Since the United States and Australia as of today have refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, no agreement exists on specific emission 
reduction targets or other obligations for the two giants. Without this it will 
be difficult for Tuvalu to identify any specific violations of obligations that 
may have harmed their legal interests, and hence the legal standing of 
Tuvalu will be at stake.  
                                                 
104 http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php, 
(accessed 2007/10/12) 
105 Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option, 10188 
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After the latest assessment report of the IPCC being published earlier this 
year opinions on the causes of global warming have shifted. Scientist now 
agree that the emission of greenhouse gases is the most likely cause to 
global warming. As in all fields of study there are dissenting opinions also 
to this view, but that will, as noted in the delimitation not be taken into 
account. Being able to demonstrate a casual relationship between these two 
factors, greenhouse gas emission and global warming, it might be possible 
and probably even likely to argue that the two countries are in violation of 
their general obligations under the UNFCCC.    
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7 International Enforcement 
Enforcement in this context has to be understood as the right to take 
measures to ensure the fulfillment of international environmental legal 
obligations that have been infringed upon. In practice it can be obtained by a 
ruling of a court, tribunal or other agreed specified body that the obligations 
have not been fulfilled. International enforcement may be instigated by one 
or more states, an international organization or by non-state actors. Focus 
here will be placed on the instigation of state actors. States have the primary 
role when it comes to international enforcement as they are the principal 
subjects of international law. In order to enforce a rule of international law 
the state in question has to have legal standing. In order to have this, the 
state has to provide proof that its legal rights have been infringed upon, it is 
then, in the words of the International Law Commission (ILC), an “injured 
state”.106 Article 42 of the ILC’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility 
provides that: 
 
 
 
“A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the 
responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is 
owed to: 
(a) that State individually; or 
(b) a group of States including that State, or the international                    
community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation:
  
 
(i)  Specifically affects that State; or 
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to 
change the position of all other 
States to which the obligation is 
owed with respect to the further 
performance of the obligation.” 
 
The first case where a State individually is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another State includes actions arising from bilateral 
treaties, special performances within multilateral treaties or rules of general 
international law which give rise to individual obligations. In the second 
case entitling a group of States to invoke responsibility, the right would for 
example, according to the ILC, arise in situations of pollution on the high 
seas contrary to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas Article 
194.107 Other States than the “injured state” may also invoke the 
responsibility of another State under the provisions of ILC Draft Article 48, 
which notes that: 
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“Any state other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another in accordance with paragraph 2 if: 
 
(c) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States 
including that State, and is established for the protection of 
a collective interest of the group; or 
(d) the obligation breached is owed to the international 
community as a whole.” 
 
The second paragraph in this Article deals with obligations erga omnes, a 
concept which has been clarified in earlier chapters. 
 
Cases concerning environmental damage can in general be said to be of 
three different natures, where the first is damage to its own territory. The 
other two where State permission is given to activities that cause damage to 
the territory of another State, or in an area beyond national jurisdiction.108 
Thus the later two are of greater interest in this work since global warming 
is a matter of transboundary concern. 
 
 
7.1 Damage to the environment of another 
state 
The Trail Smelter case is the portal case for environmental damage in the 
territory of a State caused by another State. There are several other cases of 
the same nature where States have suffered environmental damages due to 
activities permitted by other States. The most important to mention are the 
Lac Lanoux case, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case and the Nuclear Tests case. 
It is not difficult for a State to claim that it has suffered damage and is in 
fact an “injured state” after suffering environmental damage, since the 
spectra of possible damages is extremely broad. Possible injuries that can 
follow as a consequence from environmental damage may be injuries to its 
citizens, economic loss or property damage.109 In general this is not 
particulary complex at all. As the Trail Smelter case showed, a State may 
not use its territory in a manner that would damage interest outside its 
jurisdiction. No damages are tolerated.  
 
 
7.1.1 Environmental damage in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction 
Whilst the Trail Smelter case was fairly straight forward, not all cases are as 
simple as that. More complicated legal considerations were needed in the 
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Nucelar Tests case. Australia and New Zealand called upon France to halt 
its atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific. However the case was 
more complicated than the allegation of an infringement of their sovereignty 
by nuclear deposit of fallout in its territory. Could Australia and New 
Zealand bring a claim based on the breach of an erga omnes obligation, not 
only for them but for the whole international community to be free from 
nuclear tests generally, before the ICJ. The issue became whether the states 
had legal standing to bring an environmental claim before the court, for 
damages beyond their national jurisdiction, despite not suffering any 
material damage. This raises the possibility of instigating procedures due to 
violations of erga omnes obligations. Generally a party to a treaty has the 
right to seek an enforcement of the counterparts obligations if it believes the 
other party is in violation of them, regardless of any material damages 
suffered or not. For instance, a failure by a state party to the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol to fulfill its obligations under the treaty, entitles other parties to 
enforce this obligation by either invoking the dispute or non-compliance 
settlement mechanisms of the Protocol, where no damage has to have been 
suffered. Most of other environmental treaties are not as explicit 
establishing dispute settlement mechanisms that will settle the question of 
enforcement right in accordance with the provisions available under that 
treaty. Some treaties even preclude their application to the global commons, 
such as the 1991 Espoo Convention which precludes parties from requesting 
environmental impact assessments or similar in respect to the global 
commons.    
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8 Human Rights Litigation as an 
option 
Another potential option for bringing legal action against a state not in 
conformity with its international obligations could be to file a petition in a 
human rights forum. With the recent alarming temperature rise in the Arctic 
many indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Russia or Greenland 
face problems as severe as the peoples of the Pacific do. Their fundamental 
human rights are threatened, among those perhaps even the right to life 
itself. The effects of global warming become especially problematic for 
indigenous peoples due to their close connection to nature and their 
surroundings.   
 
If a human rights approach could be used to defend the rights of indigenous 
peoples in Arctic regions in order to protect them from global warming, the 
question could be elevated from being an environmental issue into also 
becoming one of human rights.110 It would also show on the possibilities for 
other entities than states in international law to “receive” their justice. 
 
The damages suffered by the Pacific States are part of a large environmental 
circle. The sea level rise partly due to the melting of the Arctic ice, but the 
Arctic and its inhabitants also suffer from thawing of the permafrost and 
damaged forests and tundra.111 Populations of marine mammals are affected 
and hence also the livelihood of the inhabitants in the region. Hunters in the 
area have based their hunting seasons on environmental cycles such as the 
freezing or melting of the sea and ice respectively. These cycles have now 
become disrupted, causing the environment to become less reliable and 
more dangerous for these hunters earning their livelihood on the ice. 
Houses, roads pipelines and other infrastructure have been damaged by the 
thawing of permafrost that causes erosion, landslides and slope instability. 
Shoreline erosion of up to 100 feet a year have been observed in some 
locations of the Canadian, Siberian and Alaskan Arctic, which obviously 
threatens local communities in these coastal areas112.  
 
As severe as these impacts of global warming are for the indigenous people 
of the Arctic, this is only a foretaste of what is still to come. The damages 
described above are only part of a much larger destruction of the Arctic 
environment and its ecosystems. 
 
Human rights law presents an opportunity to hold states accountable for 
action or inactions that have caused harm to these groups. Claims in this 
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fields covers a wider scope than that of conventional legal systems in the 
way that a wider range of claims can be considered and they will be less 
constrained by procedural hurdles.113   Human rights law tends to push the 
boundaries of international law and helps create public opinion through 
declarations of aspirations which paves way for binding and enforceable 
legal strategies.114
 
 
8.1 Possible forum 
While there are many possible forums where procedures against human 
rights violations can be instigated, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) is one of the most promising. The IACHR, 
situated in Washington D.C, is one of two bodies in the inter-American 
system for the promotion and protection of human rights, whereas the other 
is the Inter-American Court Of Human Rights, with its seat in San Jose, 
Costa Rica. The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of 
American States (OAS). Its mandate is found in the OAS Charter and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. The IACHR represents all of the 
member States of the OAS. It has seven members who act independently, 
without representing any particular country. The members of the IACHR are 
elected by the General Assembly of the OAS. It is a permanent body, which 
meets in ordinary and special sessions several times a year. The Executive 
Secretariat of the IACHR carries out the tasks delegated to it by the IACHR 
and provides legal and administrative support to the IACHR as it carries out 
its work.115
 
In the end of 2005 the Inuit of Alaska filed a petition against the United 
States in front of the IACHR. The petition sought relief for violations of the 
human rights of the Inuit resulting from United States greenhouse gas 
emissions causing global warming. It alleges that the United States by 
failing to control its greenhouse gas emissions has caused the Earths climate 
to change. As described earlier the impacts for the Inuit and their lifestyle 
have been devastating. Also resources on which the Inuit depend are at risk. 
Polar bears, walrus and seals are on the brink of extinction due to the loss of 
sea-ice. 116
 
The petition handed in contains testimony from sixtythree Inuit from 
northern Canada and Alaska, and uses sources such as traditional knowledge 
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from hunters and elders wide ranging peer reviewed science, and the 
ongoing and future destruction of the environment of the Arctic as well as 
the culture and hunting-based Inuit economy. The reason why it focuses on 
the United States, is because it is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, and yet it refuses to adopt any effective domestic measures or join 
any international measures such as the Kyoto Protocol. Legally the petition 
asks the Commission to declare the United States in violation of the Inuit 
rights affirmed in the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man and other instruments of international law.117  The Inuit petition also 
urges the Commission to recommend the United States, a member of the 
OAS, to adopt mandatory limits to its emissions of greenhouse gases and 
cooperate with the community of nations to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The recommendations 
of the IACHR are not of a mandatory nature, but the IACHR can take non-
complying OAS members to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
This mechanism where the IACHR may take members to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights makes the IACHR a suitable option for 
addressing injustices from climate change and puts pressure on large 
greenhouse gas emitters. Besides a report by the IACHR finding the that the 
rights of the Inuit have been violated by the United States could have a 
moral as well as political force that may motivate political changes and, 
could if necessary, serve as support to future litigation. 
 
 
8.2 Other Optional Forums 
Yet another promising forum for litigation would be the 1982 UNCLOS. 
The Convention mainly applies to the marine environment, however it can 
be argued that the impacts of climate change a likely to alter the 
effectiveness and function of treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS.118 The 
Convention, which has been in force since 1994, has provisions which 
arguably prohibit uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. Article 194(2) of 
the Convention provides that: 
 
 
” States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that 
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as 
not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or 
activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread 
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in 
accordance with this Convention.”119
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Even though UNCLOS is mainly applicable to the marine environment of 
the earth it may be possible to argue that the adverse effects of climate 
change alter the functions and the effectiveness of treaties such as 
UNCLOS.120 But as the IPCC has predicted the rise of the sea level to be 
between 0.2-0.9121 meters during this century and varying changes in 
oceanic temperature, this may make the UNCLOS applicable. With this and 
the increase of greenhouse gas emissions come other potentially harmful 
effects to the marine environment. Hence if these effects on the marine 
environment are caused by greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, 
States emitting have an obligation to limit these to more appropriate levels 
as will be seen. Parts of the Convention and its principles, and certainly 
Article 194(2)122, are part of customary international law and binding as 
such, non-signatories such as the United States, are hence obliged to adhere 
to those principles. An advisory opinion under the Convention could even 
according to Strauss “implicate the legality of US global warming 
emissions.”123 Putting pressure on a State not adhering to its obligations 
could over time force the State to cease these activities, but time is running 
out and waiting for such a State to find it lost conscience may not be an 
option. State responsibility within UNCLOS is for instance activated when a 
State is not living up to its environmental obligations, this can be seen in 
Article 235 of UNCLOS which states that: 
 
“States are responsible for the fulfillment of their obligations 
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. They shall be liable in accordance with 
international law” 
 
 And the different mechanisms available within the Conventions to resolve 
disputes between members are listed in Article 287 (1) of the UNCLOS, but 
as the United States is not member to the Convention this does not have to 
be investigated. 
 
A last route that may be usable and is worth mentioning, since it is strongly 
related to UNCLOS, is the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement.124 The 
agreement has included the existing binding dispute resolution mechanism 
from UNCLOS125, and in contrast to UNCLOS, the United States adheres to 
the agreement. The problem with this agreement as was the problem with 
the FCN treaties described above, is that it was not intended as a combatant 
of climate change and global warming. The agreement is an mechanism to 
                                                 
120 N. Rinnerberger, Drowning Islands: Social Justice Through Litigation? 
121 Climate Change Synthesis Report 2001, p.4 
122 Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option, 10188 
123 Ibid. 
124 The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U.N.  Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratry Fish Stocks, August 4, 1995, U. N. Doc.  
A/CONF.164/37. 
125 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, Part VIII provides that disputes arising under it be 
settled through the Law of the Sea’s Dispute Settlement provisions in Part XV, art. 30. 
 49
protect certain species of fish. However, if it can be shown that greenhouse 
gas emissions are a danger to the fish, a creative or liberal interpretation of 
the protective provisions126 could be seen as covering these emissions.  
 
 
 
8.3 Other Options for Damaged States or 
private entities 
 
Even if the opening of procedures against a State in violation of any 
obligations owed towards the damaged State fails, either on jurisdictional 
grounds or others, perhaps other routes will be open. 
 
As tropical storms and hurricanes have increased both in intensity and 
frequency around the Gulf and the Atlantic coast over the last years, federal 
courts across the United States have received lawsuits resulting from what is 
claimed to be impacts of global warming. The cases filed have involved 
alleged noncompliance with statutory mandates, such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969127, and tort claims. Considering our 
present situation, it is highly probable, that there are more to come. Private 
companies in sectors working with potentially environmental hazardous 
activities should be aware of the current development and anticipate 
eventual future lawsuits and try preventing them by tracking the relevant 
developments in the environmental field. Shifting focus from States towards 
companies and other private entities may prove easier when it comes to 
proving of guilt, it is harder for a company to hide behind a reasoning of 
having acted due diligently while it may be easier for a State. Domestic 
pressure on the United States as well as Australia to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions has increased in recent years as these lawsuits by 
environmental organizations and other groups have been filed against them. 
Environmental organizations in Argentina and Germany have also started 
legal action to combat climate change.128
 
 
 
8.3.1 What could a damaged State ask for 
 
The complete or partial loss of territory caused by global warming results in 
different consequences for the affected States. Firstly, when it comes to the 
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question of Statehood, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties 
of States (signed in Montevideo 1933) has defined what constitutes a State. 
Article 1 of the Convention, which is the most well known one, sets out the 
criteria of statehood and has been recognized as part of customary law.  
 
The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications:  
a) a permanent population; 
b) a defined territory;  
c) government; and  
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.   
 
Given that the population of a State loses all or parts of its territory and first 
of all survives, either by still residing on the remaining land or by migrating 
to other States. Then the first criteria is still fulfilled.  It is the second that 
may cause a larger problem. What if no territory exists? The second 
criterion, a defined territory, has been described as any bits of land above 
water. From this follows that if a State loses its territory it can no longer be 
considered a State, at least not according to the definition in the Montevideo 
Convention. With the IPCC in its earlier report from 2001 suggesting that 
the sea levels will rise between 0.2-0.9 meters by the years 2100, these 
problems are at our doorstep. 
 
The first solution that comes to mind and that could be demanded is 
certainly help with resettlement of the population. This should preferably be 
to land similar but more secure than their current abodes, technically this 
may prove difficult since most low lying coastal areas or islands would 
suffer from similar problems. 
 
Another option would be to re-establish sovereign states elsewhere, 
meaning that other sovereign States would need to cede territory. With the 
same preferences as in the first option above, Australia or New Zealand, due 
to proximity and affluence could be suggested as candidates, regardless of 
their willingness. It seems unlikely that any State regardless of its 
geographical position would be positive towards ceding parts of its territory. 
But if some State would, problems could arise with regards to the rights of 
natural resources and the stretching of the internal waters and exclusive 
economic zones. 
 
A third and maybe more radical solution would be the re-creation of islands 
elsewhere. A problem with this solution is that many potential island 
candidates for re-creating islands are protected as environmental, tourist 
and/or scientific havens – for example Australia’s Great Barrier Reef or the 
Kermadec Islands of New Zealand.129 In spite of this, the same problems as 
above would arise. 
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Common for these last two models is also the problems that would arise 
with governance. Perhaps a redefinition of  “state” or “territory” could be 
helpful, however any such suggestion would probably meet a strong 
reluctance from the international community. Several different governance 
models such as provinces, sovereign states, free associations or overseas 
territories already exist though they will not be further investigated here. 
 
Having shown three different possible solutions as to what a future plaintiff 
might want to demand, the first option of resettlement seems to be the most 
feasible. Everywhere around us there is a constant flow of people leaving 
their countries of origin looking for a better place to live elsewhere, but the 
need for a resettlement from these areas is somewhat different. While 
Australia has shown little interest in resettling people living in threatened 
areas in their proximity, New Zealand has already created a special 
immigration category, the Pacific Access Category130. It is a ballot system 
that each year allows up to 250 people from Tonga, 75 people from Tuvalu 
and 75 people from Kiribati to gain residence if certain criteria are meet by 
the applicants. However this scheme is designed for integration of the 
foreigners and not a re-establishment of island communities or States. Even 
with this newly crated immigration scheme the sea level might just be rising 
too rapidly for it to have any effect.     
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9 Conclusion 
The general rule in international law is that States, as sovereigns over their 
own territory, have the possibility to use their lands, as they seem fit, if the 
actions meet the international legal standards. Any action by a State within 
its own borders is limited by implications this action may have on areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This obligation has been 
manifested in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as well as in 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. The principle has also been taken up in 
the preamble of the UNFCCC giving it even more strength. Even though 
declarations per se are not legally binding under the concept of international 
law, there can be no doubt that this obligation is part of customary 
international law and hence is also binding under international law. This is 
supported by jurisprudence in the Corfu Channel case and the Trail Smelter 
case, but also by scholars and from its inclusion in several international 
instruments. Harmful spillover effects onto areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, from activities within national jurisdiction are not tolerated in 
international law. This is succinctly described by the latin maxim “Sic utere 
tuo, ut alienum non laedas”131, the maxim itself is of no legal value but 
merely describes this principle of international law.   
 
Global warming is according to the IPCC attributable to man-made 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other anthropogenic gases. States now have 
an obligation to prohibit unlimited emissions of greenhouse gases if they are 
to aggravate the effects of global warming. This is an obligation that can be 
found in implicitly in UNCLOS, as well as in other instruments. The 
UNFCCC itself does not set any specific limitations upon States to reduce 
their emissions of these gases. In the UNFCCC the signatories have 
recognized the need to reduce their emission in Article 4, however the 
reductions aimed at are non specific and somewhat vague to their nature. It 
is not specified how climate change is to be mitigated only that it should be 
so through national measures. It has left these obligations to the optional 
Kyoto Protocol, where States oblige themselves to reduce their emissions to 
individually set targets during a specific period. Neither UNCLOS nor the 
Kyoto Protocol is universally applicable, rather they are both subject to 
ratification. Larger parts of the UNCLOS are however considered part of 
customary international law, meaning that any State (except persistent 
objectors), including the United States, is bound by these parts. Through the 
UNCLOS, states could ask for an advisory opinion to be issued on whether 
the emissions by the United States are meeting the legal requirements of the 
codified customary international law in the resolution.  
 
This could put more pressure on the United States to reconsider its 
environmental policies. Since neither the Kyoto Protocol has been ratified 
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by the United States government, which has even expressed that they never 
will sign it, there are no specific reduction goals set out for the United States 
to meet. However the United States have recognized the need for mitigation 
against climate change but does not see the Kyoto Protocol as the most 
appropriate option for themselves. As a matter of fact, the United States 
reaffirmed its commitment to the UNFCCC when it presented the Clear 
Skies Initiative.  But despite all this, there is still an obligation to reduce its 
emissions of greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide. This obligation exists in 
the UNFCCC where the signature counts as much as the ratification, and the 
United States have signed the UNFCCC. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) article 18 states the following with respect the 
signing of treaties: 
 
 
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of a treaty when: 
  
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting 
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall 
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or  
 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the 
entry into force of the treaty  
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. “132
 
Hence it is under the obligation not to take actions that would be contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty at hand. The UNFCCC’s object and 
purpose is to stabilize the emission of greenhouse gases “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system”133. Thus the United States is obliged to keep their emissions below 
a level that would be harmful to the climate, which is the Conventions 
object and purpose. Most likely even the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
can be seen as a violation of the obligations in the UNFCCC. A signatory 
State to the UNFCCC, which does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, cannot be 
said to fulfill its obligations to mitigate against global warming, to the extent 
the UNFCCC requires.  
 
Neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the UNFCCC can be said to be part of 
customary international law. This is not related to their recent adoption but 
is due to the rejection of the United States along with others, though there is 
also a clear lack in the state practice element. Some states, all of them 
considered as developing states, are exempt from the obligations.   
 
Looking at the six different principles previously described three of them 
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appear to be of more importance in this case. They are the principle of 
sustainable development, the polluter pays principle and the precautionary 
principle. The legal status of not merely these three, instead of all six 
principles can be contested and is somewhat unsure. In summation the value 
of these principles increases but as of today it cannot be said that they are 
legally binding by themselves or together unless they are incorporated into 
treaties.  
 
Obligations to mitigate against global warming and its adverse effects on the 
environment exist. They exist as principles in treaties, as customary 
international law, as general principles of international law, though perhaps 
even more importantly they exist as an obligation erga omnes. Due their 
connection with the concept of jus cogens, from which no derogations are 
allowed, there cannot be any derogation from obligations erga omnes.  As 
far as the obligations to mitigate against climate change and global warming 
comes they exist and they may exist in the form of obligations erga omnes.  
 
The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility contains rules claiming that 
any internationally wrongful act of a State should be followed by 
responsibility for the State in question. It is enough that this act can be 
attributable to the State, it can for instance come from activities by 
industries within their jurisdiction. 
 
A breach of any in the above described obligations is, if it can be 
attributable to the State, to be seen as a breach of an international obligation. 
The obligation not to emit greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide at levels 
that may harm the environment is the one in question. It is irrelevant 
whether these activities are carried out by private entities since States cannot 
hide behind such a veil of ignorance. In that case the State should have 
regulated these activities. Jurisprudence supports this view. In the Trail 
Smelter case the court came to the conclusion that emissions from a private 
entity on Canadian soil were attributable to Canada as a State. While it 
would be more or less impossible to prove what emission has caused what 
effect, the IPCC has concluded that greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide 
cause these climate changes. The difficulties of pointing at a casual link may 
call for changes in the evaluation of proof instead of letting the perpetrators 
go “unpunished” as this would weaken the entire climate change regime. 
 
Generally Tuvalu can invoke state responsibility of any State, which has not 
reduced their stipulated emissions. It is easier against countries which are 
bound to oblige to the Kyoto Protocol as specified goals are set up. It can 
however do the same against States that have only signed the UNFCCC, 
such as the United States, as they are obliged not to defeat the object and 
purpose of the UNFCCC. The claims would be for breaching the Kyoto 
Protocol, or that a State have not efficiently enough mitigated against 
climate change through internal regulation. 
 
Claims within the human right framework does not seem to have any real 
chance of success. There exists no universal human right to a healthy 
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environment, it only exists on a regional basis in Latin America and Africa. 
Besides this, a violation of any such hypothetical right would preclude that 
the State had control over the effects which harmed the right to a healthy 
environment, and the effects of pollution cannot be said to be within the 
control a State. 
 
As Tuvalu at present has no FCN treaty in force with the United States, the 
option of trying to use any in such a treaty existing clause is ruled out. I 
have not either been able to find any other treaty or agreement between the 
two where the ICJ is set out as a dispute solutor. It seems very unlikely that 
the United States would ever agree for any proceedings to start in front of 
the ICJ and any argumentation around this would be hypothetical. Treaties 
in force with other States with such provisions have earlier been interpreted 
in a broad sense but it seems very unlikely that the language in the clauses 
should allow for any broader interpretations than the one made in the The 
Case Concerning Oil Plattforms and the Nicaragua case. In fact, the ICJ 
rejected any future interpretations that would require any such broad 
interpretation of these clauses as to include environmental harm. Difficulties 
with acquiring ICJ jurisdiction is one of the main problems for Tuvalu at 
this point, another is the evaluation of proof. A casual link between one 
States emission and the effects of rising sea levels at Tuvalu, would be 
difficult if not impossible to prove. 
 
Whilst it would not be possible to instigate procedures under the UNCLOS 
adjudicatory system since the United States do not adhere to it, there are 
other options within this Convention. One option would be to obtain an 
advisory opinion on the request of one of the Conventions political organs 
(the Assembly and the Council). This could be used to investigate whether 
or not the emissions are legal, this would then bind the United States, as it 
has to adhere to the Conventions environmental regulations, which are part 
of customary international law. 
 
One possible path to try could be to let another State speak for them. This 
on the other hand would require, that the violations committed by the United 
States can be seen as violations of erga omnes obligations. Presently this it 
is somewhat disputed, but perhaps future environmental law might develop 
in this direction. Without regarding an eventual development of 
environmental law, political considerations of States are likely to play a big 
role. Would States be prepared to instigate procedures against another 
member of the international community on behalf of an “insignificant” State 
such as Tuvalu? The question remains open for discussion. In any case the 
FCN treaties entered by the United States with Denmark and the 
Netherlands could allow for such procedures. Given the geographical of 
Denmark and the Netherlands it is not bold to say that even they are in great 
danger of at least partially being engulfed by the sea, and who knows, they 
may in the future want to use this option for themselves? 
 
Other countries that contribute largely to global warming through emissions 
of anthropogenic substances might be in another position and Tuvalu could 
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shift focus onto these States instead. Where treaties with provisions 
referring disputes the ICJ exists the difficulties of jurisdiction would not 
arise. The question of proofing the link between the caused damages and 
emissions would however still be at hand. If the problems of jurisdiction 
were to be overcome, Tuvalu would still have to, if it is to have any chance 
of success, show that the United States have wrongfully caused or will cause 
harm to its interest. According to Gupta such argumentation is academic and 
few of the small island States are actually contemplating such procedures 
due to the technical difficulties, however future development may change 
this.134  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 J. Gupta, Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to  
Address Climate Change, p. 3  
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